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Abstract
Metacognition addresses the issues of knowledge about cogni-
tion and regulating cognition. We argue that the regulation
process should be improved with growing experience. There-
fore mental models are needed which facilitate the re-use of
previous regulation processes. We will satisfy this requirement
by describing a case-based approach to Introspection Planning
which utilises previous experience obtained during reasoning
at the meta-level and at the object level. The introspection
plans used in this approach support various metacognitive
tasks which are identified by the generation of self-questions.
As an example of introspection planning, the metacognitive
behaviour of our system, IULIAN, is described.
Introduction
Experimental results from both psychologists and instruc-
tional scientists suggest that human cognitive performance
can be improved by the use of metacognitive skills such as
self-monitoring, prediction, and self-questioning (Wong &
Jones, 1982; Wong, 1985). The term metacognition has been
used in different ways (Gavelek & Raphael, 1985). However
there is an increasing tendency to follow Flavell (1976), who
related metacognition to metamemory (Brown, 1987; Cam-
pione, 1987). Metamemory has been defined by Flavell and
Wellman (1977) as an agent’s knowledge about his/her
memory. Flavell (1976) viewed metacognition as referring to
the “active monitoring and consequent regulation” of the
agent’s own cognitive processes. As a result, we can regard
the term metacognition as describing two distinct but related
issues: the issue of knowledge about cognition and the issue
of regulating cognition. The first term includes awareness of
the agent’s resources with respect to the demands of the
agent’s thinking; for example, the availability of analogous
knowledge during an analogical mapping task. The second
issue involves self-regulating mechanisms such as planning
and monitoring (Brown, 1975; Brown, 1987; Flavell & Well-
man, 1977; Meacham, 1972; Patterson et al., 1980). Such
meta-cognitive skills should be improved with growing
experience. Reasoners should be able to re-use such experi-
ence when they maintain mental models about meta-cogni-
tion.
An important instance of metacognition is metacomprehen-
sion which addresses those issues of metacognition related to
reading (Flavell, 1976; Baker & Brown, 1984). In metacom-
prehension, but also in other areas such as problem solving,
it has been demonstrated that the use of metacognitive
skills such as self-questioning improve learning perfor-
mance (Schewel & Waddell, 1986; Blank & Covington,
1965).
In Artificial Intelligence systems, experience related to a
given domain and the ability to be reminded of previous
experience have been modelled by the paradigm of Case-
Based Reasoning, where previous experience is usually
represented as cases (see Kolodner 1993 for an overview).
Important components of the case-based reasoning
approach are the retrieval of a previous case which con-
tains a previous problem and its solution, and the adapta-
tion of this case to obtain a solution for the current
problem. If this approach is applied to plans rather than to
problem/solution pairs, we refer to it as case-based plan-
ning (Hammond, 1989).
Often case-based reasoning systems use memories
indexed in terms of prediction failures which occurred
during the reasoning process. When the system generates a
wrong prediction, the case on which the prediction was
based is annotated with a characterisation of the failure sit-
uation. The annotation is used as an index during future
case retrieval. As a result, the prediction failure can be
avoided in the future. This view of memory is referred to
as failure driven memory (Schank, 1982).
Recent research in case-based reasoning has addressed
the issue of guiding the reasoning process by introspec-
tion. Within this general area, research has mainly focused
on the representation of knowledge about cognition.
For example, Ram & Cox (1994) exploited the concept
of failure driven memory. When a failure occurs, the sys-
tem generates a knowledge goal which drives the explana-
tion process. This process utilises meta-explanation-
patterns which are causal introspective explanation struc-
tures explaining how and why an agent reasons.
Cox and Freed (1994) presented examples of ways in
which self-knowledge can be used during the learning pro-
cess. Such knowledge supports the selection of diagnosis
and repair strategies from among alternatives; it enables a
system to distinguish between failure hypothesis candi-
dates; and it supports the use of such knowledge across
domain borders.
 Models of device behaviour were used in the ROBBIE
system to refine indexes and to repair reasoning failures
(Fox & Leake, 1994; Fox & Leake, 1995). The system
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monitors its own reasoning process and compares it with the
“ideal” performance of its model.
Oehlmann et al. (1994) used introspective self-questioning
to support reasoning from different perspectives. The reason-
ing perspectives are represented as explicit descriptions.
Introspection mechanisms for improving memory search
have been discussed by Kennedy (1995) and Leake (1995).
Kennedy uses a domain independent representation scheme
which supports the memory search during analogical reason-
ing. Leake views memory search as a reasoning task and
describes a framework in which retrieval is guided by intro-
spective reasoning. Moreover, introspective reasoning can be
used to learn how to improve the memory search.
It is a common feature of all these approaches that they
represent particular types of control knowledge explicitly.
However, a general computational model of metacognition
requires knowledge structures which can be used in different
metacognitive tasks. Such a set of knowledge structures has
to address the representation of knowledge about cognition
as well as the processes of regulating cognition.
In addition to the task of regulating the current cognitive
process, an agent should be reminded of previous regulation
processes. We will therefore describe an approach based on
case-based introspection planning which satisfies this
requirement. An introspection plan contains an index to
retrieve the plan from memory and a sequence of actions.
The actions are related to cognitive behaviour, e.g. an action
might compare the result of a reasoning process with a rea-
soning goal as part of a monitoring task. The case-based
planning approach enables an agent to be reminded of previ-
ous subprocesses.
We will describe the approach in the context of our imple-
mentation IULIAN which addresses a task involving discov-
ery learning in terms of questions, answers and experiments,
all generated by case-based planning. The example used
involves electric circuits and systems of water pipes. A top
level view of the example is presented in Section 2 followed
by a description of introspection plans (Section 3). Section 4
elaborates on the circuit example and explains the question
based method of introspection planning. Finally, in Section
5, we will discuss our approach with respect to the general
problem of metacognition.
Example
The approaches of case-based reasoning and case-based
planning have been used in the IULIAN system to model
discovery learning. We will use the discovery task to exem-
plify the issue of regulating cognition and representing the
regulation process. It has been noted that human discoverers
can be characterised as experimenters or theorists according
to the discovery strategies employed (Klahr & Dunbar,
1988). Experimenters attempt to deduce regularities from
experimental results. In contrast, theorists are able to gener-
ate a hypothesis by search processes without any experimen-
tation; the hypothesis is then tested experimentally.
We will use an example to motivate the idea of repre-
senting the regulation of cognitive processes. This exam-
ple describes how an agent decides between experiment
driven and theory driven behaviours. The example focuses
on two strategies: a reasoning strategy and an activity
strategy. The reasoning strategy is based on the generation
of a sequence of self-questions and answers, whereas the
activity strategy is based on the generation of a sequence
of actions suitable to perform experiments. We note that a
strategy emerges from the process of organising questions
and answers into a sequence; strategies are not based on
pre-stored sequences of questions and answers.
We assume that the IULIAN system receives as input
the description of an electric circuit with a lamp and closed
switch in parallel, and attempts to predict the behaviour of
the circuit. The system is reminded of a previous experi-
ment involving a serial circuit with a lamp and closed
switch. This previous experience leads to the (wrong) pre-
diction that the lamp in the parallel circuit is on because
the lamp in the serial circuit is on. IULIAN tests the
hypothesis by building the parallel circuit and observing
its behaviour. The actual result indicates that the lamp is
off; this constitutes an expectation failure which the sys-
tem has to explain. The explanation can be generated by
using the reasoning strategy analogical mapping or the
activity strategy experiment perturbation (see Figure 1).
During analogical mapping (Oehlmann, et al., 1993),
the IULIAN system is reminded of a previous experiment
in the domain of water pipes. This experiment has the
same topological structure as the parallel circuit experi-
ment and includes a pump, a paddle wheel, and a valve. In
addition, it is linked to an explanation which explains the
behaviour of the water pipe system. This explanation can
be mapped back to the domain of electric circuits. The
adapted explanation is suitable to explain the behaviour of
the initial parallel circuit.
Alternatively, the system may perturb the retrieved
experiment involving a serial circuit. This circuit can grad-
ually be modified until it is identical to the initial parallel
circuit. After each modification, the explanation connected
to the serial circuit experiment is adapted. Obviously, the
circuit behaviour changes when an additional wire is
inserted parallel to the lamp in the serial circuit. The sys-
tem uses the generated circuit experiment to modify its
explanation about the circuit behaviour and finally arrives
at the explanation for the explanation failure.
Both strategies described in the example lead to a cor-
rect explanation. Therefore the IULIAN system has to
decide between theory driven analogical mapping and
experiment driven perturbation behaviours. This decision
can be supported by introspection planning. Furthermore,
introspection planning can be used to monitor reasoning
and experimentation processes. We will discuss examples
of metacognitive decision and monitoring processes in the
next section.
The IULIAN System
The decision process characterised above has been
explored in the IULIAN system which uses the planning of
self-questions, answers and experiments to model reasoning
about plans and actions. The main task of the system is the
discovery of new explanations to revise an initial theory.
Figure 2 shows the main modules of the system: question
planner, answer planner, experiment planner, hypothesis for-
mation, question strategy planner, and introspection planner.
It also indicates that the IULIAN system represents an inte-
gration of case-based reasoning and case-based planning
rather than a single case-based reasoner: the hypothesis for-
mation module is a case-based reasoner whereas the other
modules are case-based planners.
The Question Planner Module accepts a problem descrip-
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Figure 1: Experiment Perturbation and Analogical Mapping
tion as input, generates a question about the problem, and
transfers control to the Answer Planner. If a question can-
not be answered, the Question Planner and the Experiment
Planner can be used to generate additional questions and
experiments which helps the IULIAN system recover from
this situation and to provide the knowledge needed to gen-
erate the answer. Before an experiment is performed, the
Hypothesis Formation module hypothesizes the experi-
mental result. When the actual result is generated, the
Hypothesis Formation module determines an expectation
failure as the difference between the hypothesis and the
actual result.
If an expectation failure has been detected, the explora-
tion process is initiated. At its simplest, the process of
question and answer generation is based on the Question
Planner and the Answer Planner which generate a question
about the problem and attempt to answer it. The returned
answer should be wrong because if the correct information
were known, IULIAN would have generated the correct
hypothesis and the expectation failure would not have
occurred. If a question cannot be answered, the Question
Planner and the Experiment Planner can again be used to
generate additional questions and experiments in an attempt
to provide the missing knowledge.
During this process of question-based reasoning and
experimentation-based activity, questions focus on objects of
the domain to be investigated such as lamp and battery. In
addition, the Question Planner generates questions which
focus on the system’s reasoning process. If the system asks
such a question, using an answer plan to generate a sentence
is not sufficient because the answer planner needs additional
meta-knowledge which is not available to it. Acquiring this
knowledge is the task of the introspection planner.
The basic knowledge structures of the IULIAN system are
experiments and plans which are used as cases. An experi-
ment consists of two components: an experimental setting
(e.g. a description of an electric circuit with battery, lamp,
and switch) and the result of an experiment such as the state-
ment that “the lamp is on when the battery is switched on.”
Experiments are represented by objects and relations
between objects. Objects are represented as Memory Units
(MU) which contain an object frame and a content frame.
The context frame describes the context in which the object
occurs represented by a set of relations. The content frame
comprises several sets of intentional descriptor values
referred to as views. The object frame comprises general
information about the object. In addition to experiments,
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causal models are used to explain experimental results.
Causal models have a similar representation to experi-
ments. However, they are stored in a separate library and
their objects are viewed as abstract concepts, e.g. the con-
cept “lamp” rather than an actual lamp used in a given
experiment (Oehlmann, 1992). In addition, causal models
use particular relations between concepts to represent
causal links. A causal model is linked to the experiment
used to generate that model. Question plans are used to
apply case-based planning techniques to the generation of
single questions. For example, the question “What is the
state of the LAMP?” can be built by combining the sub-
structures “What”, “is” “the state of”, and “the
OBJECT1”. OBJECT1 is a variable which is instantiated
with the string “LAMP” during plan execution. A question
plan has two main parts: the set of descriptors used for
indexing the plan and a sequence of steps.
The plan is retrieved by matching its index with the cur-
rent situation; this is characterised by the goals the system
pursues in asking the question. Additional slots in the head
of each question plan contain a list of variable instantia-
tions referred to as bindings and a set of collector slots.
The bindings are used to instantiate variables in the step
actions. In the collector slots, intermediate results are
stored during the question formation process. Each plan-
ning step has precondition, goal, and action slots to ensure
correct plan execution. If plan execution fails, the usual
explanation-based repair mechanisms are employed, (see
Hammond, 1989). It is an important advantage of the case-
based planning approach that new questions can be
learned by modifying previous questions plans. Answers are
generated in a similar way; however, steps in answer plans
may have particular actions which retrieve knowledge from
the library of experiments needed to form an answer. For
example an answer to the question “What is the state of the
LAMP?” may be generated by executing the following steps:
the first step retrieves the object LAMP and identifies an
object which shares the relation HAS-STATE with the object
LAMP. This object is ON and is stored in the binding list of
the answer plan. The following steps instantiate two vari-
ables with the objects LAMP and ON and combine these
variable values with the substrings “The”, “has”, and “the
state”. The resulting sentence is “The LAMP has the state
ON.”
The case-based planning approach to generating questions
and answers is highly flexible because it only depends on the
current situation and the goals the system is attempting to
pursue. Moreover, new plans can be generated by adapting
existing plans to new situations.
An introspective answer is a sentence generated as
response to a question about the reasoners internal knowl-
edge and its internal processes. An answer plan which has to
generate an introspective answer contains special steps. Exe-
cuting such a step results in a call of the introspection plan-
ner. This planning process provides the information needed
by the answer planner which can then complete the answer.
An example of an introspection plan will be discussed in the
next section. Introspection plans address different metacog-
nitive tasks such as assessing goals, reasoning strategies,
resources needed to perform a given reasoning strategy, fail-
ures which occurred during previous reasoning strategies,
and conditions which have to be satisfied in order that a strat-
egy can be executed.
During the generation of questions and answers, the sys-
tem notes the names of the question and answer plans used.
These names are stored in a reasoning strategy plan. Reason-
ing strategy plans have a similar structure to questions and
answer plans. However, their actions contain simple calls to
the Question and Answer Planners; i.e. after executing a
sequence of questions and answers for the first time, a rea-
soning strategy plan is built which can be retrieved in future
situations and executed directly.
In addition, the IULIAN system uses experimentation
plans to perform experiments. Experimentation plans
describe the steps which have to be executed in order to per-
form an experiment. The experimental setting and the result
of plan execution are stored as a new case. The same basic
plan structure used for introspection plans has been
employed for experimentation plans, although the index
vocabulary differs (Oehlmann et al., 1993).
The Introspection Process
In this section, we describe our approach for regulating
the cognition process based on introspection planning by
extending the example described in Section 2.
The system supports metacognitive processes by gener-
ating questions about the categories introduced in the last
section: goals, strategies, failures, resources, and condi-
tions. The system begins by attempting to explain the
expectation failure described in the example. In this situa-
tion, the two strategies experiment-perturbation and ana-
logical-mapping could be performed. We now assume that
in the source of the analogical-mapping strategy, the sys-
tem cannot retrieve an experiment which is sufficiently
analogous to the initial experiment. Introspection planning
can assess this situation and identify an appropriate strat-
egy to generate an explanation of the initial problem. In
addition, it has to monitor the execution of the questions
which realise the strategy to ensure goal satisfaction. The
stages of the process are summarised in Figure 3.
The identification of candidate questions initiating the
experiment-perturbation strategy or the analogical-map-
ping strategy requires the system to focus on the reasoning
goals to be satisfied by executing a given sequence of
questions. Therefore the system generates the following
question:
Question 1: What are the reasoning goals I
attempt to achieve?
In this situation only one reasoning goal is found which
leads to Answer 1:
Answer 1: The reasoning goal is EXPLAIN-
EXPECTATION-FAILURE.
The reasoning goal enables the system to identify the
candidate questions.
Question 2: What are the question plans
which are expected to satisfy the reasoning
goals?
Answer 2: The question plans are EXPERI-
MENT-PERTURBATION and ANALOGICAL-MAPPING.
The identified question plans now have to be evaluated
with respect to the resources needed, failures which
occurred during previous executions, and initial conditions
which have to be satisfied before a question plan can be
executed. Question 3 focuses on the resources.
Question 3: What are the resources needed
to accomplish these question plans?
The answer to this question indicates that the analogical
mapping strategy requires an analogous previous experi-
ment, whereas the perturbation strategy requires appropri-
ate modification-structures. In these structures, the
necessary knowledge is stored to modify a given experi-
mentation plan
Answer 3: The resources needed for the
question plan ANALOGICAL-MAPPING are ANALO-
GOUS-EXPERIMENT and the resources needed
for the question plan EXPERIMENT-PERTURBA-
TION are MODIFICATION-STRUCTURES.
After the relation between question plans and resources is
established, the system has to evaluate the question plans
with respect to the available resources. In particular, it has to
eliminate those question plans which require unavailable
resources.
Question 4: What are the question plans for
which the necessary resources are available?
The answer to this question needs only consider the ques-
tions plans mentioned in Answer 3, because Question 4 is
asked in the context of the previous questions and answers.
The answer to Question 4 prefers the plan experiment-per-
turbation because the modification-structures for this plan
Metacognitive Selection Process:
1. Identify reasoning goals
2. Use the reasoning goals to identify reasoning
strategies.
3. Identify resources. Eliminate those strategies
which cannot be executed, because the necessary
resources are not available.
4. Identify previous failures. Eliminate those
strategies which are likely to fail because they
failed before in a similar situation.
5. Identify initial conditions. Eliminate those
strategies which cannot be executed under the
given conditions.
6. If more than one strategy can be applied, prefer
reasoning strategies over experimentation
strategies.
Metacognitive Monitoring Process:
1. Evaluate modification result. Determine
differences between the initial experiment and the
experiment which results from the modification.
2. Evaluate understanding. The system attempts to
generate an explanation for the new experimental
result.
Figure 3: Meta-cognitive processes
are available. In contrast, the analogous experiment
needed for the question plan analogical-mapping is not
available.
Answer 4: All the necessary MODIFICATION-
STRUCTURES are available for the question
plan EXPERIMENT-PERTURBATION.
Although the candidate question plans have been
reduced to a single plan, even this strategy might not be
suitable. Therefore, the next question focuses on failures
which occurred during previous executions of the question
plan.
Question 5: What are the failures which
occurred during previous applications of
the question plan EXPERIMENT-PERTURBATION?
Answer 5: No failure occurred during a pre-
vious application of the question plan
EXPERIMENT-PERTURBATION.
Finally, the system checks if the current situation
matches the initial conditions necessary to execute the
question plan. This evaluation step has two parts: identify-
ing the initial conditions and matching the initial condi-
tions with the current situation. Question 6 addresses the
first part:
Question 6: What are the initial conditions
necessary to execute the question plan?
The answer to this question states that an initial experi-
ment and a previously retrieved experiment are necessary
to perform the question plan. In addition, the strategy
needs to access the plans which were used to generate
these experiments.
Answer 6: The initial conditions for the
question plan EXPERIMENT-PERTURBATION are
INITIAL-EXPERIMENT, INITIAL-PLAN,
RETRIEVED-EXPERIMENT, and RETRIEVED-PLAN.
The identified conditions are then used to determine
whether the conditions are satisfied by the current situa-
tion.
Question 7: Are these conditions satisfied
for the question plan EXPERIMENT-PERTURBA-
TION?
Answer 7: Yes.
This answer concludes the process of selecting between
the two candidate question plans and enables the system to
execute the question plan experiment-perturbation. If at
this stage the system were still considering more than one
plan, it would attempt to perform a reasoning strategy
before an experimentation strategy1. However, in such a
situation the system would have a high confidence in all
the selected strategies, because it has considered the goals,
resources, and failures involved.
During its execution, the reasoning strategy has to be
1. This strategy is consistent with psychological results which
have suggested that subjects perform experiments if the gen-
eration of hypotheses is not successful (Klahr & Dunbar,
1988).
monitored. This process is again supported by the interaction
between self-questions and introspection plans. First the
result of the experiment modification is compared with the
initial experiment.
 Question 8: Is the perturbed experimentation
plan sufficiently close to the initial
experimentation plan?
Answer 8: No, there are components in the
target experiment which do not have equiva-
lents in the source experiment.
The answer indicates that an additional experiment modifi-
cation has to be performed. However, the system has first to
ensure that it “understands” the perturbed experiment. The
understanding criterion is given by the ability to explain the
experimental result in the context of the experimental setting
(see Schank, 1986).
Question 9: Do I understand this behaviour?
Answer 9: Yes the LAMP is ON, because there
is a wire between the BATTERY and the LAMP
and there is a CURRENT-FLOW through the
LAMP.
The sub-processes of generating experiment modifications
and evaluating them are iterated until the resulting experi-
ment is identical with the initial experiment. The final expla-
nation is used to explain the initial expectation failure (see
Section 2).
Introspection Plans
An introspection plan has two main components: a header
and a sequence of steps (Figure 4).Important elements of the
header are the slots name, planning-goal, and failures. The
plan identifier is stored in the name slot. The slot planning-
goal contains the goals the system attempts to satisfy by exe-
cuting the plan; the slot failures characterises planning fail-
ures which have occurred before. If a plan execution fails,
the system attempts to explain and to repair the failure. The
repair mechanism uses repair rules similar to those described
by Hammond (1989). The two slots planning-goal and fail-
ures form the index of the introspection plan, i.e. these slots
are used for plan retrieval. In addition, the header includes
the slots binding-list and intermediate-result. The binding-
list contains pairs of variable names and their values. If an
action of a planning step contains variables, the binding-list
is used to instantiate them. The intermediate-result slots are
used to store a result which has been generated by a given
planning step and which will be used by subsequent steps.
A step has four slots: name, precondition, goal, and
action2. The name slot serves as an identifier for a given
step. In the slot precondition, the conditions are described
which have to be true before the action given in the action
slot can be executed. The slot goal lists the specific goals the
2. Note that Figure 4 shows a reduced version of the original plan.
In particular, the slots precondition and goal in the planning
steps are omitted.
system attempts to satisfy by executing the action
described in the action slot. The value of the action slot is
a list with a function name as first element. The remaining
list elements are the arguments which, together with the
name, form a function call. If the function has no argu-
ments, the action list contains the function name as a sin-
gle element.
The introspection plan given in Figure 4 is executed as
part of the generation of Answer 4 in the previous section.
The answer has to assess the resources related to the ques-
tion plan experiment-perturbation. These resources are
modification structures which are used to transform an
experimentation plan. The first step in the introspection
plan identifies steps in the initial experimentation plan
which are to be deleted. The second step attempts to iden-
tify features which are to be added. The results of the first
two steps are used to identify a modification structure
which can be used to transform the experimentation plan.
The final step attempts to evaluate the modification struc-
ture in terms of the modification goal to be achieved.
Plan
Name: resource-assessmnt@modification-struct
Planning-Goal: assess-modification-structure
Failures: None
Binding-List:
 ((initial-plan serial@switch-lamp)
(final-plan parallel@switch-lamp))
Intermediate-Result1:
mod-struc@remove-object
Intermediate-Result2: None
Intermediate-Result3: None
Planning Steps:
1. Planning Step
Step-Name: check-deleted-features
Action: (identify-features-to-be-deleted
initial-plan final-plan)
2.Planning Step
Step Name: check-added-features
Action: (identify-features-to-be-added
initial-plan final-plan)
3. Planning Step
Step Name: identify-mod
Action: (identify-modification-structures
initial-plan final-plan)
4. Planning Step
Step Name: evaluate-mod
Figure 4: Introspection Plan
Discussion
We have identified a need to represent knowledge about
metacognitive processes. Our novel approach to metacogni-
tive experience is characterised by the integration of intro-
spective self-questions and introspection plans. We have
argued that introspection plans can be used to represent men-
tal models about meta-cognitive processes. Moreover, they
can be used to realise these processes.
In the example described in this paper, an introspection
plan has been used to decide between the reasoning strategy
analogical-mapping and the activity strategy experiment-
perturbation. Other reasoning strategies which the IULIAN
system has addressed are: changing the viewpoint (Oehl-
mann et al., 1994), changing the focus, and consequence
checking. An example of an additional activity strategy is
enforcing the stability of the environment (Hammond, et. al.
1993; Oehlmann, 1995).
Introspection plans can be re-used because they represent
metacognitive experience which can be adapted to new situ-
ations. We have shown that this approach enables a system to
decide between experiment driven and theory driven discov-
ery strategies based on predictions about these strategies.
Moreover, we have demonstrated that introspection plans
can be used to monitor the execution of such strategies. We
expect that introspection plans could support other strategies
such as reasoning about an issue from different perspectives
(Oehlmann et al., 1994).
This paper focuses on metacognitive processes; future
work has to address the representation of knowledge about
metacognitive states and events in an integrated model (see
Leake, 1995; Cox, 1995; Cox & Freed, 1994). For example,
in the current approach, assessing the availability of experi-
ments which serve as a resource for a given reasoning strat-
egy has been achieved by searching the memory of
experiments. The result of the assessment could be repre-
sented as meta-knowledge in the form of a case which would
make this particular search unnecessary in future.
In addition, we expect that the results described in this
paper could be applied to educational technology. Kass
(1992) used the idea of “coaxing case-based reasoning” in
the design of educational software. Introspection plans could
be used in a similar way to motivate a student’s metacogni-
tive processes.
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